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THE PRICE OF PROTECTION: COMPENSATION FOR 
PARTIAL TAKINGS ALONG THE COAST 
Matthew Hromadka

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in At-
lantic City, New Jersey with winds exceeding 80 miles per hour.1  
Enhanced by a cold front sitting off the Northeast Coast of the United 
States, the storm took a violent turn directly into the heart of the tri-
state area.2  As the storm approached, it spanned 485 miles in width, 
ultimately causing serious damage in over ten states.3  The impact 
was most severe along the coastlines of New York and New Jersey.4  
With record storm surges and driving wind and rain, the storm crip-
pled the coastline, sending those in its path into a state of emergen-
cy.5  The hurricane was the most powerful of its kind, reminiscent of 
the disastrous Great New England Hurricane of 1938, which made 
landfall in New York.6 
Immediately following the storm, 8.5 million people were 
 
 J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2011, St. 
John’s University.  Thank you to my advisor, Professor Rena Seplowitz, for her support and 
guidance with this Comment and my law school career.  I would like to thank the Touro Law 
Review for providing me with this wonderful opportunity.  I would especially like to thank 
Charissa Schwab, my parents, Frank and Nancy Hromadka, my sister, Katey Hromadka and 
my grandmother, Helen D’Alessandro, for all of their love and support. 
1 Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, FEMA (Oct. 18, 
2013), http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy. 
2 Matt Daniel, This Date in Science: Hurricane Sandy Hits U.S. Northeast, EARTHSKY 
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://earthsky.org/earth/this-date-in-science-hurricane-sandy-hits-u-s-
northeast. 
3 Id. 
4 See Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, supra note 1 (discussing the number of residents 
affected by Hurricane Sandy and the cost of the damage). 
5 Id. 
6 Daniel, supra note 2 (discussing how the 1938 hurricane made landfall on Long Island, 
N.Y. and southern New England with sustained winds at about 100-120 miles per hour, and 
was responsible for approximately 700 deaths). 
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without power, and over 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary 
shelters.7  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) 
deployed 1,690 officers over the course of a year and provided more 
than $1.4 billion in federal aid to survivors of the storm.8  The storm 
killed 110 people in the United States, as well as 72 residents in the 
Caribbean Islands.9 
Hurricane Sandy permanently damaged coastal residences, 
businesses, and the shoreline itself.10  For instance, on Fire Island, 
New York, the dunes were diminished by 54.5% from their pre-storm 
volume and restored to less than 20% of their original size.11  These 
dunes have been either entirely destroyed or reduced by as much as 
15 feet in height.12  In addition, the important foliage that serves as 
the core structure of the dunes was obliterated in many places, weak-
ening the ability of the dunes to withstand future storms.13  The coast-
line shifted roughly 200 feet, pushing back dunes by as much as 70 
feet.14  The beach destruction caused by Sandy was the equivalent of 
thirty years of erosion occurring in one single night.15 
Coastal communities affected by Hurricane Sandy depend on 
dunes to withstand future storms and ongoing erosion.16  Dunes play 
an important role in protecting otherwise exposed coastlines from 
natural erosion, storm surges, wind, and waves produced by severe 
weather systems.17  Although dunes naturally erode over time, storms 
such as Sandy increase the rate at which this erosion occurs and hin-
 
7 Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, supra note 1. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Wayne Parry, New Jersey Ends Beach Disputes with 1-2 Punch, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 25, 2013, 1:19PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/25/new-jersey-beach-
dunes_n_3990107.html (discussing Hurricane Sandy’s effects on businesses and coastal res-
idences); Daniel, supra note 2 (discussing the erosion and beach destruction resulting from 
Hurricane Sandy). 
11 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Hurricane Sandy Eroded Over Half of Fire Island’s Dunes: 
New Report Quantifies Coastal Change, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Aug. 28, 11:33:53 AM), 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=3674&from=rss. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Photos Reveal Severity of Hurricane Sandy’s Impact, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?I 
D=3452#.Ux08K2eYaM8 (explaining that coastal erosion resulting from the storm was 
equivalent to the projected models for a thirty year period). 
16 Id. 
17 Hurricane Sandy Eroded Over Half of Fire Island’s Dunes, supra note 11. 
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der the natural replenishment.18 
This Comment discusses the various jurisdictional approaches 
used when portions of private property are taken in order to conduct 
government funded beach re-nourishment programs aimed at combat-
ing erosion and restoring lost beach.  Section II of this Comment ex-
plains the effects of coastal erosion in the area affected by Hurricane 
Sandy.  Section III examines recovery efforts by federal, state and lo-
cal governments in response to coastal erosion and Hurricane Sandy.  
Section IV assesses the scope of government actions that constitute a 
taking along the coast.  Section V presents the historical origins of 
the fair market value approach for partial takings, which allows cer-
tain benefits to mitigate compensation for condemned property.  Sec-
tion VI discusses the case of Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan,19 
which adopted the fair market approach of just compensation for 
condemned property occurring as a result of a coastal replenishment 
program.  Section VII examines jurisdictions that use the fair market 
value analysis and its variations.  Section VIII discusses jurisdictions 
that use neither the fair market value approach for partial takings cas-
es nor offset just compensation by benefits realized by public pro-
jects.  Section IX explores the problems with approaches that exclude 
benefits from reducing compensation for property taken by the gov-
ernment in order to protect threatened coastlines. 
The United States Constitution, as well as state constitutions, 
permit government takings of private property but require just com-
pensation to be paid in return.20  In circumstances along the shore 
where property has been taken to protect coastal communities, just 
compensation must accurately reflect the cost of the loss.  To achieve 
such a result, a fair market value approach that considers both the 
benefits and detriments to the property owner occurring from the tak-
ing yields the most equitable outcome. 
II. THE EFFECTS ON LOCAL COASTAL COMMUNITIES 
Hurricane Sandy, the second costliest storm in United States 
 
18 Id. 
19 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013). 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”); see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Private property shall not be taken 
for public use without just compensation.”). 
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history,21 created overarching economic difficulties for the national 
government.22  The federal government has spent roughly $60 billion 
on recovery efforts, and this number is certain to rise as a result of 
ongoing projects.23  A year following the storm, an additional $1.4 
billion in assistance was allocated to roughly 182,000 survivors of the 
storm.24  The United States Small Business Administration has pro-
vided $2.4 billion in low interest disaster relief loans to revive coastal 
industries.25  More than $3.2 billion has been disbursed to state, local 
and tribal governments for recovery efforts, as well as $74 million in 
Federal Hazard Mitigation Grants.26 
Coastal businesses and residents have also experienced over-
whelming economic obstacles.27  Businesses in New Jersey suffered a 
cumulative loss of $8.3 billion, with over 19,000 businesses losing at 
least $250,000 each.28  In New York City, Hurricane Sandy impacted 
over 23,000 small businesses, which employed roughly 245,000 peo-
ple.29  The total cost of damages in New York City was $19 billion.30  
In total, 650,000 homes located near the water were destroyed by the 
storm.31  The New York City Department of Environmental Protec-
tion received $402 million from FEMA in order to rebuild damaged 
homes and repair the infrastructure of service facilities, such as waste 
and water treatment plants.32 
 
21 Hurricane Katrina was the costliest storm in United States history, causing an estimated 
$108 billion in damage.  David Porter, Hurricane Sandy was Second-Costliest in US History, 
Report Shows, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.co 
m/2013/02/12/hurricane-sandy-second-costliest_n_2669686.html. 
22 Id. 
23 Scott Gurian, Tracking the Federal Sandy Aid Money One Year Later, N.J. SPOTLIGHT 
(Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/10/28/tracking-the-federal-sandy-aid-
money-one-year-later/?p=all. 
24 Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, supra note 1. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See Phyllis Furman, Hurricane Sandy, One Year Later: Businesses Struggle to Survive, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 26, 2013, 6:42 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hurrica 
ne-sandy/hurricane-sandy-year-business-article-1.1493143 (discussing the effects of Sandy 
on business recovery and local economies). 
28 Erik Blake, Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy, NAT’L HURRICANE CENTER 
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf. 
29 Furman, supra note 27 (explaining that the majority of businesses were small, employ-
ing under 50 employees). 
30 Blake, supra note 28, at 18. 
31 Id. at 14. 
32 A Year After Hurricane Sandy, More Than $2.1 Billion In FEMA Public Assistance 
Grants In New York Helps Clear Debris, Reopen Public Facilities, FEMA (Oct. 24, 2014), 
4
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Furthermore, the storm’s geological effects exposed greater 
portions of the coastline to storm related damage.33  Hurricane Sandy 
caused record storm surges in low-lying coastal areas, with the larg-
est being 13.8 feet in Battery Park, New York.34  The federal gov-
ernment needed to update regional flood maps for the first time since 
1983 because of the storm’s permanent alteration of the coastline, 
leaving more residents susceptible to damage from erosion.35  Ac-
cording to these new flood maps, New York City’s number of at-risk 
residents has doubled since the 1980s.36  Moreover, 67,000 buildings 
in New York City are now considered flood prone because of this re-
configuration.37 
Hurricane Sandy also impacted the insurance industry for 
both property owners and insurance providers.38  Insurance compa-
nies providing standard homeowner or property insurance were re-
quired to make substantial payments to policy-holders within a very 
short window.39  The influx of claims depleted insurer earnings and 
revenue.40  Although this did not substantially affect homeowners’ 
insurance pricing, flood insurance rates have increased significantly 
following the storm.41  The National Flood Insurance Program 
(“NFIP”) is the primary provider of flood insurance for at-risk resi-
dents.42  Prior to the storm, NFIP was already facing financial diffi-
 
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/10/24/year-after-hurricane-sandy-more-21-billion-
fema-public-assistance-grants-new. 
33 Jill Colvin, FEMA Redrawing City’s Flood Zone After Superstorm Sandy, DNAINFO 
NEW YORK (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20121206/new-york-
city/fema-redrawing-citys-flood-zone-after-superstorm-sandy. 
34 Hurricane Sandy Recovery, NAT’L PARK SERVICES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.nps.gov/ 
stli/after-hurricane-sandy.htm. 
35 Colvin, supra note 33. 
36 Bloomberg Administration, Mayor Bloomberg Announces Results of Flood Insurance 
Study Demonstrating New Federal Flood Maps and Rules Will Significantly Increase Costs, 
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF NEW YORK CITY (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/344-13/mayor-bloomberg-results-flood-insurance-study-demonstrating-new-
federal-flood-maps-and/. 
37 Id. 
38 Dennis Sebayan, How has Hurricane Sandy Impacted Insurance Rates?, SMARTASSET 
BLOG (May 14, 2013), http://www.smartasset.com/blog/housing/how-has-hurricane-sandy-
impacted-insurance-rates-2/. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. (stating that although some private lenders offer this coverage, the NFIP comprises 
the largest market). 
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culties due to $18 billion of debt incurred from Hurricane Katrina.43  
Notwithstanding this debt, NFIP has made an additional $7.9 billion 
in Hurricane Sandy payments, which has caused flood insurance rates 
to soar.44 
III. RECOVERY EFFORTS, BEACH REPLENISHMENT, AND DUNE 
RECONSTRUCTION 
The federal government has focused on rebuilding residences 
and businesses along the shore, while also providing protection from 
loss as a result of natural erosion and future storms.45  Unfortunately, 
this task has been costly and complicated.  FEMA is responsible for 
providing aid to state and local authorities, and organizing responses 
in the event of a natural disaster.46  In order to expand FEMA’s abil-
ity to adequately respond to Hurricane Sandy, Congress enacted leg-
islation which outlined the implementation and funding of recon-
struction. 
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (“SRIA”) was 
signed into law on January 29, 2013, coupled with the Disaster Relief 
Appropriations Act (“DRAA”).47  This legislation made major 
changes to the previous FEMA standards for allocating funds for dis-
aster relief.48  These Acts provide more lenient standards for adminis-
tering assistance to areas affected by the storm.49  Explicitly, the 
SRIA calls for the “[u]se of all or part of the excess grant funds for 
cost-effective activities that reduce the risk of future damage, hard-
ship, or suffering from a major disaster and other activities to im-
prove future Public Assistance operations or planning.”50  Among 
these activities discussed, dune reconstruction has been one of the 
many measures taken to prevent future loss.51 
The SRIA and DRAA provide additional federal funding for 
 
43 Sebayan, supra note 38. 
44 Id. 
45 Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013, FEMA (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.fema. 
gov/about-agency/sandy-recovery-improvement-act-2013. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act, supra note 45. 
51 Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane Sandy, FEMA MEDIA 
LIBRARY (Apr. 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1537-20490-
8057/fema499_1_6_rev.pdf. 
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reconstruction along the shore.52  Specifically, the SRIA states: 
That $2,902,000,000 of the funds provided . . . shall be 
used to reduce future flood risk in ways that will sup-
port the long-term sustainability of the coastal ecosys-
tem and communities and reduce the economic costs 
and risks associated with large-scale flood and storm 
events in areas along the Atlantic Coast.53 
These federal funds are used to aid state and local agencies in the re-
covery process.54  Because beach replenishment programs impose 
significant financial burdens on state and local agencies, federal fund-
ing is imperative.55  Following the storm, coastal communities have 
greatly relied on the receipt of this aid.56 
Furthermore, the methods for implementing reconstruction 
have been identified in detail in both acts.  The SRIA and DRAA des-
ignate the Army Corps of Engineers to assess the damage along the 
Northeast coast.57  Based upon these assessments, the Army Corps of 
Engineers is responsible for designing, coordinating, and executing 
reconstruction.58  The SRIA sets forth numerous procedures and 
standards that federal agencies must comply with, as well as provi-
sions directed at state and local authorities receiving recovery aid.59  
The SRIA even acknowledges potential disputes arising from recon-
struction by requiring FEMA to adopt a dispute resolution program.60  
Despite the detailed procedures included in both acts, FEMA retains 
ultimate discretion over design and implementation of beach replen-
 
52 Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act, supra note 45. 
53 Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, § 1101 127 Stat 4 
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2014). 
55 Christie Administration Disburses More Than $22.5 Million in Essential Services 
Grants To Sandy-Impacted Municipalities, STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICIAL WEBSITE (Oct. 
11, 2013), http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552013/approved/20131011b.html 
(discussing the economic ramifications of Sandy recovery efforts on municipal government 
agencies). 
56 Id. (discussing the budget issues of local townships in New Jersey that faced hardships 
providing adequate waste management services, as well as difficulties with continuing em-
ployment of local police officers and other public officials because of the excessive cost of 
reconstruction following Hurricane Sandy). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 5189(f) (2013). 
58 Id. 
59 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5121. 
60 Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act, supra note 45. 
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ishment efforts.61 
Additionally, pursuant to the SRIA and DRAA, FEMA has 
provided private contractors with guidelines and methods for rebuild-
ing after the storm.62  The guidelines are designed to encourage pri-
vate builders to reconstruct the shore in a way that reduces the risk of 
future loss from recurring erosion.63  According to FEMA’s report 
manual, Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane 
Sandy,64 residents in areas with substantial risk for flooding from 
beach erosion must take steps to mitigate potential damage.65  The 
report recommends several building methods that substantially re-
duce the risk of loss for coastal properties.66  Among these methods, 
the report suggests raising residences significantly from their previ-
ous base level and building structures as far inland as possible within 
the property boundaries.67  Furthermore, the report explains that 
property owners in affected coastal areas should anticipate zoning 
changes as a result of the permanent alteration of the shore, which 
may affect the ability to build on shorefront property.68 
IV. THE SCOPE OF TAKINGS ALONG THE COAST 
When beach replenishment programs are put into effect, gov-
ernment agencies typically need to take part of coastal property own-
ers’ land to adequately rebuild the shoreline.69  However, what actu-
ally qualifies as a “taking” in a coastal context has been a difficult 
question.  Courts dealing with land disputes along the East Coast en-
dorse the government’s right to take physical portions of private land 
 
61 Id. 
62 Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane Sandy, supra note 51. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. (explaining that the BFE refers to the Base Flood Elevation, which is the area 
that has a one percent chance of being flooded in any given year). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane Sandy, supra note 51. 
68 Id. (explaining that many areas considered low-risk prior to Hurricane Sandy may expe-
rience changes in zoning regulations). 
69 See, e.g., Fisher v. Town of Nags Head, 725 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) 
(reviewing a beach re-nourishment program that required public takings to implement the 
project); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 
711-12 (2010) (reviewing a similar project that required the condemnation of coastal proper-
ty). 
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along the shore under the takings clause.70 
Although it is undisputed that condemnations of physical por-
tions of coastal land are takings and require just compensation, shore-
front homeowners have unique property interests that extend beyond 
the physical boundaries of their property.71  These special rights are 
often infringed by construction along the shore.72  Beach replenish-
ment programs typically eliminate littoral rights to future deposits of 
sand and interfere with the right to use and enjoy the foreshore area.73  
The courts and state legislatures have interpreted whether these pro-
grams qualify as takings.74 
State legislatures and judicial proceedings have attempted to 
deal with issues regarding residents’ rights to deposits of sand and 
their relation to government takings.75  For instance, in Walton Coun-
ty v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.,76 the Supreme Court of 
Florida was faced with a dispute involving a dune replenishment pro-
gram along the Gulf Coast of Florida.77  Walton County’s beach re-
plenishment program was carried out as part of a larger scheme en-
dorsed by the Florida legislature.78  The Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act enacted in 1961 provides that “beach erosion is a se-
rious menace to the economy and general welfare of the people of 
[Florida] and has advanced to emergency proportions.”79  Moreover, 
the Act explains that “a necessary governmental responsibility [is] to 
properly manage and protect Florida beaches . . . from erosion” and 
fund replenishment programs along the coast.80 
Under Florida common law, coastal property owners are not 
entitled to sudden deposits of sand (known as avulsions), which typi-
cally occur as result of a storm or major event that alters the coast.81  
 
70 John R. Nolan, Symposium, Regulatory Takings And Property Rights Confront Sea Lev-
el Rise: How Do They Roll?, 21 WIDENER L.J. 735, 753 (2012). 
71 Id. at 747 (discussing coastal property owners’ right to sand deposited over time, oth-
erwise known as an accretion). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 753; see, e.g., Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. 702. 
74 See infra note 82 and accompanying text (reviewing whether a Florida legislative policy 
properly adjusted littoral rights). 
75 See, e.g., id. 
76 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008) 
77 Id. at 1105. 
78 Id. at 1106. 
79 FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (2000). 
80 Id. 
81 Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1114 (“[I]f an avulsion has occurred, the boundary line re-
9
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Conversely, coastal property owners are entitled to long-term depos-
its of sand (known as accretions), which typically result from natural 
erosion.82  Aside from accretions, littoral property owners have the 
right to access, and reasonably use and enjoy an unobstructed view of 
the water.83  The Act removed property owners’ common law rights 
to future accretions because it allowed government agencies to rectify 
all accretion, avulsions and damage from erosion.84 
In Walton County, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved the 
constitutionality of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act by deter-
mining if the legislation deprived coastal land owners of their upland 
property rights and rights to future accretions.85  Specifically, the Act 
called for surveyors to inspect the Mean High Water Mark 
(“MHWM”), and after doing so, to fix an area along that line for 
dune construction, known as the Erosion Control Line (“ECL”).86  
The government was permitted to deposit sand up to the ECL after it 
was designated.87 
The property owners claimed that the establishment of the 
ECL unconstitutionally deprived them of their littoral rights because 
the Act eliminated their interests to future accretions.88  The owners 
argued that the denial of future accretions and the temporary denial of 
the rights to view, access and enjoy the water constituted a taking and 
required just compensation.89  The legislation did not mandate com-
pensation for the interference with these littoral rights.90 
The court held that the Act was not a taking and the project 
did not violate the property owners’ constitutional rights.91  The court 
reasoned that “[l]ike the common law, the Act seeks a careful balance 
 
mains the same regardless of the change in the . . . shoreline.”) (quoting 73 Am. Jur. Proof of 
Facts 3d 167 § 3, at 182) (alteration in original). 
82 Id. (“[T]he owner of the [upland] loses title to land that is lost by erosion and ordinarily 
becomes the owner of land that is added to his land by accretion . . . .”) (quoting 73 Am. Jur. 
Proof of Facts 3d § 3, at 182) (alteration in original). 
83 Id. at 1125. 
84 Id. at 1127. 
85 Id. at 1105. 
86 Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1108 (explaining the government was permitted to con-
struct only erosion prevention structures “seaward of the ECL”; however, the Act specifical-
ly reserved property owners’ rights to ingress and egress, as well as enjoyment of and access 
to the foreshore area). 
87 Id. at 1107. 
88 Id. at 1105. 
89 Id. at 1107. 
90 Id. 
91 Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1120-21. 
10
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between the interests of the public and the interests of the private up-
land owners.”92  The Act was intended to provide benefits to the gen-
eral public by preserving beaches while mitigating damages to prop-
erties, businesses, and individual homeowners.93  The court upheld 
the Act’s provision that sand resulting from government funded re-
nourishment programs is an avulsion and creates no rights in the up-
land owners.94  Further, because the court found the right to future 
accretions was not guaranteed by the common law, this could not be 
ruled a taking.95  Also, the property owners still had the rights to ac-
cess, view, and continued enjoyment the water after the completion 
of the project meant their upland interests were not taken.96  The 
court relied on Article X, § 11 of the Florida State Constitution, 
which serves “to protect Florida’s beaches, part of which it holds ‘in 
trust for all the people’”97 to conclude that the Act reflected an ap-
propriate constitutional balance between public and private rights and 
the government’s interest in protecting the state’s shore.98 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court 
of Florida’s decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Flori-
da Department of Environmental Protection,99 which directly aligned 
with the holding and reasoning in Walton County.100  The Supreme 
Court recognized that private accretion rights were subordinate to the 
state’s right to avulsions under Florida common law.101  First, the 
Court found that there was no taking because the dunes were con-
structed along the property line between private and state interests, 
 
92 Id. at 1115. 
93 Id.  The court explained that restoring and preserving the beaches from erosion-based 
damage served important public “economic, ecological, recreational, and aesthetic interests” 
along the shoreline.  Id.  The Act allowed shore-front property owners to enjoy the benefit of 
protection, replenishment of lost beach, as well as protection of existing structures.  FLA. 
STAT. § 161.088. 
94 Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1117-18. 
95 Id. at 1120-21 (explaining that the right to accretions was not absolute and is the 
equivalent property interest to an easement, which may be suspended or terminated). 
96 Id. at 1120. 
97 Id. at 1110-11 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11) (referring to the Public Trust Doctrine, 
which is a state law doctrine that designates the state as the holder of the foreshore area in 
trust for the use and enjoyment of the public). 
98 Id. at 1115. 
99 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
100 Id. at 733. 
101 Id. at 709 (describing the Florida common law that recognized dry land received by an 
accretion entitles the property owner to that new land but previously submerged land ex-
posed by an avulsion does not entitle the owner to the newly exposed property). 
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not physically on the property of the homeowner.102  Further, the pro-
ject was an avulsion under state common law; thus, the property 
owners were not constitutionally divested of their rights to accre-
tions.103  Because there was no exception to the doctrine of avulsion 
when the state caused the deposit of sand, there was no taking and no 
compensation was required.104 
The United States Supreme Court also concluded that the 
property owners had no right to direct contact with the water.105  The 
owners argued that they possessed a right to have physical contact 
with the ocean and that the establishment of the ECL deprived them 
of this right.106  The Court explained that because there was no addi-
tional littoral right to touch the water, there was no taking.107  The 
denial of contact was not a substantial interference with the littoral 
right to access requiring compensation.108  However, in its holding, 
the Court explained that if the ECL had been declared upland from 
the MHWM, there would be an actual taking of physical property and 
compensation would be required.109 
Not only have legislatures defined the alteration of littoral 
rights in response to replenishment projects, state courts have also de-
termined whether the interference with littoral rights qualifies as a 
taking.110  Consistent with the holdings in Walton County and Stop 
the Beach, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that land re-
sulting from government-funded avulsion projects did not constitute 
takings.111  In City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu,112 the court re-
viewed a government taking that involved land previously deposited 
from a beach replenishment project.113  As part of a redevelopment 
plan of commercial areas along the shore, the City of Long Branch 
 
102 Id. at 707. 
103 Id. at 730 (explaining that there is no exception to the doctrine of avulsion when the 
state caused the deposit of sand). 
104 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 730-31. 
105 Id. at 729-30. 
106 Id. at 729. 
107 Id. at 729-30 (explaining that the owners were claiming a separate right from mere 
“access” to the water, the right to “touch” the water).  The Act did nothing to substantially 
affect the right to “access” the water.  Id. at 730. 
108 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 730. 
109 Id. at 739. 
110 See, e.g., City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 560 (N.J. 2010). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 545. 
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moved to take a portion of the Lius’ beachfront property.114  The Lius 
owned a small bulkhead located on the shore with a number of busi-
nesses.115  The City offered the Lius $900,000 dollars to purchase the 
property in order to carry out the project, but the Lius rejected the of-
fer and the government proceeded with an eminent domain hear-
ing.116 
The primary issue regarding the eminent domain proceeding 
was whether the Lius were the rightful owners of a 225 foot strip of 
sand deposited on their land under a beach replenishment project 
originating in the 1990s.117  The original deed that the Lius possessed 
did not include the nearly two extra acres of beach that had accrued 
over the course of the program.118  The court held that this addition to 
the Lius’ property was an avulsion, despite the fact that the deposit 
occurred over an extended period.119  Therefore, the property owners 
were not entitled to compensation.120  The court explained that be-
cause the state holds the shoreline in trust for the public sand deposit-
ed from government projects is property of the state, not of the 
coastal property owners.121 
The court reasoned that the Lius enjoyed a protective benefit 
from the extra sand because the portion of their property contained in 
the original deed was shielded from harmful erosion.122  The benefits 
were considered a large compensatory award and justified deeming 
such deposits as avulsions.123  This protection allowed the Lius to en-
 
114 Id. (discussing the Lius’ compensation for the loss of their ocean front property due to 
an increase of 225 feet of beach from the government funded beach restoration project). 
115 City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 546. 
116 Id. (explaining that at the time of the condemnation proceeding, the court found that 
the Lius’ property had been increased over two acres from 1977 to 2010 from previous gov-
ernment funded beach replenishment programs). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 546-47 (referencing previous beach re-nourishment projects initiated by the state 
in the mid-1990s which were carried out by the Army Corps of Engineers). 
119 Id. at 554 (discussing the presumption of an avulsion rather than an accretion). 
120 City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 555. 
121 Id. 
[U]nder the public trust doctrine, the people of New Jersey are the bene-
ficiaries of the lengthening of the dry beach created by this government-
funded program.  Because the old mean high water mark remains the 
boundary line between private and public property, there was no true 
loss of land to the Lius or gain to the State. 
Id. 
122 Id. at 553. 
123 Id. at 560. 
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joy the use of their property in ways that may not have been possible 
without the beach restoration project initiated some years before—to 
declare this land to be owned by the Lius would be unjust.124 
Judicial and legislative responses to coastal erosion and dis-
putes arising from beach replenishment programs reflect sound poli-
cies.  Courts have permitted the states to limit the common law right 
to accretions in the foreshore area.125  This sacrifice by coastal home-
owners is imperative to properly execute protective projects.  Legisla-
tion such as the Beach Shore Preservation Act, adopted by the Florida 
legislature, reflects the important state interest in sheltering the shore-
line, and courts have properly supported this interest.126  Moreover, 
both the courts and legislatures have balanced common law littoral 
rights with the preservation of the state’s interests in replenishing the 
shore. 
V. HISTORICAL DEFINITION OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR 
PARTIAL TAKINGS: BAUMAN V. ROSS AND THE FEDERAL 
PRECEDENT 
The federal approach to partial takings was articulated in the 
famous Supreme Court case Bauman v. Ross.127  The Court identified 
the fair market approach, which considers benefits as offsetting fac-
tors when computing the amount for just compensation.128  In Bau-
man, the United States Supreme Court held that special benefits, 
meaning those which are reasonably calculable at the time of the tak-
ing, should be considered when determining just compensation.129  
The Court stated that the term “just compensation” does not mean the 
value of the property taken alone, but rather is an amount that is equi-
table and just in light of the circumstances of each case.130  General 
benefits, described as those that are conjectural and uncertain to oc-
cur, should not be offset from the compensation for a partial tak-
ing.131 
 
124 City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 553. 
125 See, e.g., Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1110-11; City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 545-46. 
126 FLA. STAT. § 161.088. 
127 167 U.S. 548 (1897). 
128 Id. at 584. 
129 Id. at 587. 
130 Id. at 569-70. 
131 Id. at 561-62, 583-84.  The terms “general benefits” and “special benefits” have been 
defined differently across jurisdictions following the Bauman holding. 
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The federal circuit courts of appeal have applied this distinc-
tion since the Bauman decision.132  For instance, in United States v. 
Fort Smith River Development Corp.,133 the Eighth Circuit was faced 
with a partial takings case that involved the River and Harbor Im-
provement Act.134  The Act, which sought to improve navigation and 
riverbank stability along the Arkansas River,135  was a response to re-
curring flooding and property destruction resulting from the “ravages 
of the river.”136  The project required partial takings along the 
riverbank, which was, in large part, privately owned.137 
In Fort Smith, the government condemned ninety-seven of the 
one hundred and sixty acres that belonged to the property owner.138  
Originally, in the district court, the government presented evidence 
that prior to the taking, the property could only be used for agricul-
tural purposes.139  Following the taking, the property could be used 
for industrial activities, which enhanced the value of the remaining 
land.140  The district court held that the increase in value was a gen-
eral benefit and should not offset compensation because all riverbank 
properties enjoyed this advantage.141 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and 
held that the benefits of riverbank stabilization and the enhanced val-
ue of the remaining land should be considered when determining just 
compensation.142  Consistent with Bauman, the court held that gen-
eral benefits are not considered merely because they are enjoyed by 
similar surrounding properties.143  The court explained that the bene-
fit of a sustainable riverbank enjoyed by the homeowners was special 
because it was, in fact, readily ascertainable at the time of the tak-
ing.144  Because the riverbank could now sustain use by industrial ac-
 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d 522, 525 (8th Cir. 
1965); see also Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land, 596 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
133 349 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1965). 
134 Id. at 523. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 524. 
137 Id. 
138 Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d at 523. 
139 Id. at 523-24. 
140 Id. at 524. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 527. 
143 Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d at 526-27. 
144 Id. at 526. 
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tivity, the project allowed the homeowners to rezone their property.145  
The economic enhancement resulting from the rezoning was obvious, 
and not speculative by any means.146  The court articulated the con-
cern that disregarding this valuable improvement could improperly 
reflect the loss the property owner experienced.147 
The federal distinction between general and special benefits 
provides the most effective fair market approach because it focuses 
on how the benefits will affect the individual homeowner.  The feder-
al approach accounts for benefits that the property enjoys, whether or 
not the surrounding community shares them.148  The determination 
does not focus on whether the benefits are unique to the property 
owner.149  It is fair that benefits, which enhance the value of the prop-
erty, can be considered as long as they are reasonably certain to occur 
and calculable at the time of the taking.  Conversely, the federal ap-
proach appropriately excludes speculative, conjectural, and indirect 
benefits from mitigating compensation, which safeguards a property 
owner’s constitutional right to be paid for condemned property.150  
This approach accurately represents the actual fair market value of 
the taking without under-representing property owners’ interests or 
expanding those interests in an inequitable manner. 
VI. THE CURRENT DISPUTE OVER COASTAL PARTIAL TAKINGS: 
BOROUGH OF HARVEY CEDARS V. KARAN 
The ongoing struggle over the government’s right to recon-
struct dunes and replenish erosion-ravaged beaches continues to 
spawn litigation.151  Prior to Hurricane Sandy, public works projects 
had recently replenished the dunes in response to active storm sea-
sons and recurring erosion.152  Beach replenishment programs typi-
 
145 Id. (explaining that the increase was easily computable by assessing the fair market 
value of the property based on the sustained use of the land before and after condemnation). 
146 Id. at 526. 
147 Id. 
148 Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 348 F.2d at 526-27 (quoting United States v. Crance, 341 
F.2d 161, 167 (8th Cir. 1965)) (“It is settled that special benefits do not become general 
merely because other lands in the area [of the taking] are similarly benefited.”). 
149 Bauman, 167 U.S. at 583-84. 
150 Id. at 569. 
151 See, e.g., Fisher, 725 S.E.2d at 101 (reviewing a beach re-nourishment program that 
required public takings to implement the project); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
560 U.S. at 707. 
152 See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526 (discussing an eminent domain 
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cally involve partial takings of coastal property, which require just 
compensation to be paid by the government agency to the property 
owner.153  However, there is a great deal of uncertainty among juris-
dictions as to what constitutes just compensation.154 
In The Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court clarified the calculation of just compensation while 
resolving a dispute regarding a beach replenishment program admin-
istered in 2008.155  The Borough of Harvey Cedars (“Borough”) was 
required to secure easements from coastal property owners for a fed-
eral and state funded dune construction plan.156  The plan sought to 
replenish the beach and construct twenty-two foot high dunes along 
the coast.157  The project was to be carried out over fifty years with 
replenishment occurring every five to seven years.158  The Borough 
acquired a majority of the easements necessary; however, some resi-
dents refused to grant the government access.159 
The Karans160 did not provide a voluntary easement to the 
Borough because they claimed that the project would eliminate their 
ocean view and result in loss in value and enjoyment of their proper-
ty.161  Nevertheless, the Borough acquired the necessary easement 
from the Karans through a condemnation proceeding pursuant to its 
power of eminent domain.162  The government appraiser found the 
 
dispute regarding a beach re-nourishment program implemented in 2008). 
153 See, e.g., id. 
154 Compare In re City of New York, 83 N.E. 299, 303 (N.Y. 1907) (explaining that bene-
fits to the remaining property may not be offset against the compensation award absent statu-
tory authorization), with Fisher, 725 S.E.2d at 196 (explaining that benefits may offset com-
pensation for partial takings). 
155 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526-27. 
156 Id. at 527-28.  The Army Corps of Engineers designed and carried out the project in 
conjunction with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.  Id. at 528. 
157 Id. at 527 (explaining that the project was implemented by pumping “massive amounts 
of sand on the beach to extend the shoreline seaward 200 feet” and constructing a dune wall 
the entire length of Long Beach Island). 
158 Id. at 530. 
159 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 528. 
160 The Karans owned property along the shoreline in the affected area.  Id. The Karans’ 
home was estimated at $1.9 million, but, despite agreement on this fact, both the Borough’s 
and Karans’ experts disagreed over the value of the property after the condemnation.  Id. at 
530. 
161 Id. at 530 (discussing the Karans’ theory, which was based on the notion that the elim-
ination of the oceanfront view would greatly diminish the desirability of their home on the 
market and destroy the unique nature of their oceanfront property). 
162 Id. at 526.  In April 2009, the Superior Court, Law Division affirmed the eminent do-
main power of the Borough and appointed commissioners to inspect the property and assess 
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condemned property to be worth $300 based on the loss of their 
ocean view.163 
The Karans disputed this amount as just compensation for the 
taking at the condemnation trial.164  They argued that the loss of the 
ocean view was substantial and would decrease the fair market value 
of the home because the property would essentially become “a se-
cond-row home” instead of oceanfront property.165  The Borough ar-
gued that the dune wall would actually benefit the Karans’ property 
and that any economic loss resulting from the taking would be sup-
plemented by the protection the dune wall would provide.166 
The Karans countered this position by relying on New Jersey 
State common law which only allowed certain benefits to mitigate 
just compensation.167  Similar to Bauman, the common law approach 
distinguished between general and special benefits, by stating that the 
latter may only be used to offset the compensation for a partial tak-
ing.168  Furthermore, like the definition used by district court in Bau-
man, the term “general” referred to benefits that were shared by sur-
rounding properties, as well as the individual whose property was 
partially taken.169  However, this definition deviates from the Bauman 
explanation of general benefits given by the Supreme Court.  The 
New Jersey common law offset “special” benefits, defined as being 
unique to the property owner, not shared by other adjacent property 
owners.170  This definition also differed from the Bauman explanation 
of special benefits. 
The lower court adopted the common law approach and held 
that the benefits the dune wall provided were general and should not 
be considered when calculating just compensation.171  The Borough 
presented testimony that the dune wall was a special benefit given by 
 
the value to be paid for just compensation.  Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 530.  In-
terestingly, these commissioners found $300 was adequate compensation without visiting the 
property.  Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (discussing the Karans’ expert witness who valued the loss around $500,000 based 
on a comparative sales analysis). 
166 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 531. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 536. 
169 Id. at 537 (explaining the complicated development of the “general” and “special” dis-
tinction over the course of New Jersey’s legal history). 
170 Id. 
171 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 531. 
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an Army Corps of Engineers civil engineer who specialized in coastal 
management.172  The expert testified that the defendants’ property 
had a 56% chance of total loss within a thirty-year period without the 
dune construction.173  The expert explained that the project enhanced 
the residence’s expected lifetime by 200 years.174  Further, the 
Karans’ property only had a 27% chance of surviving the next fifty 
years without sustaining any storm damage if the project was not im-
plemented.175  Despite these statistics, the lower court considered the 
dune wall a general benefit because inland properties, as well as the 
Karans’ shorefront property, were protected.176  The court neglected 
to consider the varying degrees of protection afforded to properties 
located at different distances from the ocean, and the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Karans for $375,000.177 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey overturned the 
lower court and held that the calculation of just compensation for a 
partial taking is determined by the fair market value of the proper-
ty.178  This rule was a departure from earlier cases and abandoned the 
equation used by the lower courts.179  The court explained that the 
previous distinction between general and special benefits misinter-
preted the Bauman distinction and that all benefits that were calcula-
ble at the time of the taking could be used to offset the damages.180  
The court articulated that special benefits are those that are calcula-
ble, non-conjectural and quantifiable at the time of the taking.181  
General benefits, described as those that are “speculative to occur in 
the indefinite future,” could not offset compensation.182 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey explained that the lower 
 
172 The expert was assigned through his position at the Army Corps of Engineers to assess 
the storm protection benefits the replenishment project would create.  Id. at 529. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 531 (relying on expert testimony, which explained that within a fifty year period, 
the Karans had a 73% chance of sustaining significant or total loss without the project). 
176 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 531. 
177 Id. (excluding from the jury’s consideration not only benefits the project produced, but 
also the Borough’s expert testimony that the loss of ocean view was not substantial because 
the expert himself had never experienced the vantage point from the Karans’ deck). 
178 Id. at 544. 
179 Id. at 542-43. 
180 Id. 
181 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 542-43. 
182 Id. 
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court improperly defined special and general benefits.183  The lower 
court deemed general benefits as those shared by other property own-
ers, but this directly conflicts with the definitions provided in Bau-
man.184  This misinterpretation led the lower court to improperly ex-
clude the benefits derived from the Karans’ dune wall.185  The court 
examined the extensive history of the New Jersey common law appli-
cation that was originally based on the Bauman decision.186  It con-
cluded that the development of the common law approach involved 
an incorrect understanding of general and special benefits as articu-
lated by the Supreme Court.187  The holding in Borough of Harvey 
Cedars corrected this misapplication and aligned the new partial tak-
ings approach to properly represent the Bauman distinction. 
VII. THE FAIR MARKET APPROACH: CONSIDERATION OF 
BENEFITS 
A. The South Carolina Approach 
Consistent with the federal and New Jersey approaches, South 
Carolina has also endorsed a fair market value assessment that con-
siders reasonably calculable benefits.188  In Wilson v. Greenville 
County,189 the Supreme Court of South Carolina abandoned the old 
standard for just compensation that did not consider benefits enjoyed 
by surrounding properties.190  Like the original New Jersey common 
law used by the lower court in Borough of Harvey Cedars, the previ-
ous South Carolina calculation classified special benefits as those that 
are unique only to the property owner and not shared by the commu-
 
183 Id. at 541. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 544. 
186 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 535-38 (explaining that the general versus spe-
cial distinction originated in response to the railroad industry boom in the nineteenth centu-
ry).  Many rail companies escaped compensation because general assertions of benefits al-
lowed any damages to be offset, permitting the rapid expansion of railways across the United 
States.  Id. at 536. 
187 Id. at 544 (discussing “shorthand” definitions applied by courts to the terms general 
and special, which caused deviations in the words’ meanings envisioned by Bauman). 
188 Wilson v. Greenville Cnty., 96 S.E. 301 (S.C. 1918). 
189 96 S.E. 301 (S.C. 1918). 
190 Id. at 304 (explaining that the term “compensation” incorporates a balancing of inter-
ests, mainly benefits and loss or damage). 
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nity as a whole.191 
In Wilson, the court reviewed the partial condemnation of the 
homeowners’ property in order to construct a public highway.192  The 
government argued that the taking enhanced the value of the property 
owners’ land, which should be considered as an offsetting factor for 
compensation.193  The property owners relied on the state common 
law and claimed that any benefit derived from the highway project 
was general because it was mutually shared by surrounding proper-
ties.194  They argued that this general benefit should be excluded 
when computing the damages.195 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that compensa-
tion could not be adequately determined without consideration of 
“the manner, purpose, and effect of the taking upon the remainder, in 
so far as these produce benefit[s] as well as loss[es] and damage[s], 
and if the former exceeds the latter, just compensation has been 
made.”196  The court deemed this method to be the most effective and 
relied heavily upon the federal precedent in Bauman.197  The highway 
enhanced the individual property owners’ land in a unique way that 
differed from the effect on surrounding property and should be con-
sidered for compensation.198 
Similar to the reasoning in Borough of Harvey Cedars, the 
court explained that the benefits of the project to the individual prop-
erty owner could be both general and special based on the common 
law distinction.199  However, this fact should not have excluded the 
benefits from consideration.200  The court explained that the degree of 
benefits varies based on the proximity to the highway.201  The closer 
the property was to the highway, the greater the economic enhance-
ment.202  The court concluded that the benefits were not general be-
 
191 Id. at 303. 
192 Id. at 302. 
193 Id. 
194 Wilson, 96 S.E. at 303. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 304. 
197 Id. (citing Bauman, 167 U.S. at 548) (referring in its holding to the “rule adopted by 
the Supreme Court of the United States and a majority of the states, and . . . the approval of 
most eminent text-writers.”). 
198 Id. 
199 Wilson, 96 S.E. at 303. 
200 Id. at 304. 
201 Id. at 303. 
202 Id. at 303. 
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cause all adjacent lands were similarly advantaged and that the en-
hanced value of the property was directly realized to the owner and 
reasonably calculable at the time of the taking.203 
The fair market approach identified in Wilson was clarified by 
a later decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, which also in-
volved a partial taking for road construction.204  In Smith v. City of 
Greenville,205 the court explained that the applicable state constitu-
tional provision allowed benefits to be considered for just compensa-
tion.206  The power of eminent domain provided by the South Caroli-
na Constitution permitted the state to delegate the power to local 
authorities and municipalities.207  Inherent in this delegation power 
was the authority to proscribe the manner in which the condemning 
entity could calculate just compensation.208  State legislation, which 
outlines proceedings that allow benefits to be offset, properly permits 
the condemning authority to do so within state constitutional stand-
ards.209  This approach views the condemned land and remaining land 
“as a whole,” and all injuries and benefits must be incorporated into 
the calculation.210 
The South Carolina approach endorses the fair market value 
assessment identified in Bauman.211  The Smith decision solidified 
this approach through state constitutional support and expanded the 
application of the fair market doctrine.212  The reasoning behind this 
approach was best described by the court in Smith as, “award[ing] 
 
203 Id. 
204 Smith v. City of Greenville, 92 S.E.2d 639, 643 (S.C. 1956). 
205 92 S.E.2d 639 (S.C. 1956). 
206 Id. at 643; 
Moreover, the ‘just compensation’ to which the landowner is entitled 
under Article I, § 17, is compensation for the taking, and not for the land 
taken.  In this view of the matter the land is considered as a whole, and 
the landowner’s damage the diminution of its value by reason of the pub-
lic work. 
‘The just compensation required by the constitution to be made to the 
owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropriation.  
He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, and 
no more. 
Id. at 645. 
207 Id. at 643. 
208 Id. 
209 Smith, 92 S.E.2d at 644. 
210 Id. at 645. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 643. 
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him less would be unjust to him; . . . award[ing] him more would be 
unjust to the public.”213 
B. The Florida Approach: A Limited Fair Market 
Approach 
Like the federal approach and the New Jersey and South Car-
olina approaches, Florida has endorsed the fair market value analysis 
but has limited it when only an easement has been taken under certain 
circumstances.214  For example, in Cordones v. Brevard County,215 
the court applied the fair market analysis when the County acquired 
an easement over privately owned coastal property.216  The case in-
volved a beach re-nourishment program that was funded by the state 
of Florida and locally sponsored by Brevard County.217  The County 
secured shorefront easements that would be used once every six years 
to construct dunes and replenish lost beach.218  An aggrieved property 
owner, who refused to grant an easement, challenged the resulting 
condemnation action.219  Specifically, the homeowners challenged the 
valuation of the property before and after the easement was con-
demned because the county assessor used a fair market value ap-
proach.220 
The court upheld the valuation of the easement as proper un-
der Florida law for partial takings.221  The appraiser examined the 
property taken for the easement and found it was not exclusively con-
trolled or accessed by the owners and could not be developed due to 
existing state regulations.222  Because of these two factors, the valua-
 
213 Id. at 645. 
214 Cordones v. Brevard Cnty., 781 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
215 781 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
216 Id. at 523-34. 
217 Id. at 521. 
218 Id. (explaining that the exact nature and frequency of beach re-nourishment projects 
are dictated by necessity, and securing an easement that lasts over a long period of time is 
paramount to implementing the most effective erosion control measures). 
219 Id.  There were three claims by the property owners: that “Brevard County failed to 
establish [the] necessity for the easement[],” that the court approved an easement of unlim-
ited duration, and that the valuation of the partial taking was improper.  Cordones, 781 So. 
2d at 521. 
220 Id. at 523. 
221 Id. (explaining that the case was remanded due to the court’s agreement with the prop-
erty owner’s claim on appeal that the original easement needed to fall within a fifty year pe-
riod). 
222 Id. (relying on the appraiser’s explanation at the condemnation proceeding that the 
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tion was based primarily on the “potential density of development for 
the upland property.”223  The court found this method appropriate, 
explaining that the value was “expressed as the difference between 
the market value of the land free of the easement and the market val-
ue of the land burdened with the easement.”224  Further, the county 
appraiser considered a sales comparison and “income approach” to 
all upland properties in the area and derived a fair market value from 
these methods.225  The court held that this adequately represented the 
loss to the property owners.226  Although it was never argued that 
benefits should not be offset, the court explained that the “value of an 
easement cannot be ascertained without reference to the dominant es-
tate to which it is attached.”227  This implies that when assessing just 
compensation, the court must consider the effect the taking has on the 
remaining property. 
However, the court in Cordones explained that the fair market 
value approach should not be used in all situation228    The court ar-
ticulated that the fair market valuation should not be used when the 
property interest was not “unique, none of the improvements on the 
property had been displaced, and the taking involved only an ease-
ment.”229  These limitations exclude benefits when the condemning 
entity acquires an easement, the project does not affect the improve-
ments by the homeowner, and other property owners share the bene-
fits of the project.230  In essence, the fair market value approach is 
compromised in the area of coastal disputes because beach replen-
ishment programs typically involve easements.231  Thus, the Florida 
approach may reach a different outcome than the federal, New Jersey, 
 
public regularly used the portion of sand taken to access the foreshore). 
223 Id. 
224 Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 523. 
225 Id. at 524 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 523-24. 
228 Id.  
229 Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 523-24 (relying on an Indiana state court decision that out-
lined this distinction but did not refer to any Florida precedent on this point). 
230 Id.  This distinction is problematic for coastal takings because many projects do not 
affect the improvements, involve easements and create benefits for the community as a 
whole.  Due to this, benefits almost certainly will not offset damage awards in a coastal set-
ting. 
231 See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 541 (explaining the municipality 
needed to secure easements over private property); see also Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1108 
(discussing easements acquired by the municipality for beach re-nourishment). 
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and South Carolina fair market analyses would. 
VIII. THE EXCLUSION OF BENEFITS FOR JUST COMPENSATION 
A. The New York Approach: Distinguishing between 
Land Taken and Remaining 
The New York partial takings approach does not allow bene-
fits to be considered for the remaining land.232  However, both gen-
eral and special benefits can mitigate compensation for the land tak-
en, which is consistent with the previously discussed fair market 
value approaches.233  Despite this similarity, the New York approach 
specifically rejects the Bauman precedent for reducing compensation 
for partial takings.234  This policy allows property owners to receive 
compensation for their condemned land without considering the en-
hanced value of the remaining land caused by the taking.235  Simply 
put, New York courts disregard the purpose of the taking and only 
look at the portion of land acquired by the government entity.  Unlike 
the fair market value approach, New York distinguishes the land re-
maining from the land taken.236  This distinction undermines the 
Bauman precedent because the benefits property owners enjoy from a 
partial taking affect the remaining land, not the condemned property. 
In Chiesa v. State,237 the New York Court of Appeals reiterat-
ed this policy and held that the benefits enjoyed by property owners 
whose land was taken could not offset the damages award for the en-
tire taking.238  In Chiesa, the property owners owned a 193-acre plot 
of land of which twenty-two acres were taken to construct a new in-
terchange for a thruway.239  The taking increased the property value 
to the remaining land.240  The court citied Bauman and discussed the 
 
232 Chiesa v. State, 324 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1974). 
233 See, e.g., In re City of New York, 83 N.E. 299. 
234 Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d. at 331-32.  This approach requires two proceedings for a taking: 
one for the land taken, and one for the remaining land.  Id. at 332.  In operation, this “dual” 
proceeding requirement does not allow compensation for the remaining land to be offset by 
the benefits generated by the condemned property.  Id. 
235 Id. at 331-32. 
236 Id. (discussing the Bauman decision and the precedent it has set regarding partial tak-
ings). 
237 324 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1974). 
238 Id. at 331. 
239 Id. at 330. 
240 Id. (explaining that the theory of enhancement in value was based on the fact that the 
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Supreme Court’s reliance on early New York decisions to endorse 
this federal partial takings policy.241  Although this may have been 
the case, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished the current 
case from the earlier decisions in New York that appeared to support 
consideration of benefits.242 
The New York Court of Appeals explained that the early de-
cisions statutorily permitted the exercise of eminent domain by the 
state and required dual proceedings to account for surrounding prop-
erties.243  In each of the earlier cases, statutory authority allowed spe-
cial and general benefits to offset damages for the remaining land but 
not for the actual damage award of the condemned land.244  The court 
explained that benefits to the remaining property could never offset 
the compensation for the taking.245  In effect, this approach will not 
consider the protection the dunes provided for the remaining proper-
ty.  The Court of Appeals ultimately held “that in no case should an 
award be made for less than the value of the property actually taken 
by condemnation.”246 
The support for the New York approach relies upon the state’s 
power to tax and the placement of the burden of payment on the state 
and the taxpayers, not the individual who lost property.247  In Chiesa, 
the court expressed serious concern about situations where the state 
would be able to generally assert benefits to the remaining land to 
offset the damages for the property taken and escape the constitution-
al requirement for just compensation.248  The court had similar wor-
ries that benefits that exist at the time of the taking may be discontin-
ued, eliminating any benefit that was subtracted for the taking.249  
 
closer proximity to the Thruway would cause an increase in the demand for the property). 
241 Id. at 331. 
242 Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 332. 
243 Id. 
244 Id.; see, e.g., Livingston v. City of New York, 8 Wend. 85 (N.Y. 1831) (explaining that 
this case involved “dual” proceedings, which permitted the state to assess benefits as an off-
setting factor through statutory provisions). 
245 Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d. at 333. 
246 Id. at 332. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. (describing the situation where the state could offset both general and specific bene-
fits against the remainder and how this would be an “arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of 
the State’s power of taxation.”). 
249 Id.; see also In re City of New York, 83 N.E. at 299 (describing the dangers of offset-
ting benefits to the remainder when the benefit was not guaranteed to last in perpetuity, thus 
becoming a false gift). 
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Essentially, the court was apprehensive about the offsetting of bene-
fits against the award, and the state’s abandoning the use of the prop-
erty, stripping the property owner of just compensation.  Moreover, it 
appears that the court believed the state bore the burden of paying for 
public projects through its power to tax.  The reasoning was that the 
property owner already paid for the project through his or her taxes 
and that reducing the compensation award would be additional pay-
ment for the project that other owners (who did not have property 
condemned by the government) were not required to make.250 
B. The Minnesota Approach: Excluding Benefits 
Shared by Adjacent Property 
The Minnesota partial takings law follows an approach simi-
lar to the recently overturned New Jersey common law that distin-
guishes between general and special benefits on the basis of unique-
ness to the property owner.  In State by Lord v. Hayden Miller Co.,251 
the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that: 
When part of a tract is taken by eminent domain, the 
owner is entitled to the difference between the market 
value of the tract immediately before the taking and 
the market value of what is left after the taking, ex-
cluding from consideration general benefits and de-
ducting from the difference special benefits.252 
On its face, this test aligns with the Bauman and Borough of 
Harvey Cedars decisions; however, the classification of general and 
special benefits differs, resulting in significantly different outcomes.  
The dispute in this case involved a condemnation proceeding for part 
of the property owners’ land that was taken for the reconstruction of a 
local service road of an interstate highway.253  At the center of the 
dispute was the lower court’s instruction to the jury explaining gen-
eral and special benefits.254  The actual meaning of these terms 
 
250 Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d. at 332. 
251 116 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 1962). 
252 Id. at 537. 
253 Id. at 536. 
254 Id. (explaining that the main contention by the state in the case was that the frontal ac-
cess to the road enhanced the property value, while the property owners contended this actu-
ally conferred a greater detriment and should increase the damages award for the partial tak-
ing). 
27
Hromadka: The Price of Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
888 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
caused confusion and the municipality disputed the award on the 
ground that the jury did not consider the adequate amount of special 
benefits.255  The court rejected this argument, stating that the jury was 
permitted to offset special damages, as it saw fit, not that it was re-
quired to make this determination.256  Like the lower court in Bor-
ough of Harvey Cedars, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on the 
idea that general benefits are those that are shared by the surrounding 
community and are not idiosyncratic to the condemned property 
owner.257  If adjacent property owners shared any benefits realized 
from the new highway, benefits could not offset compensation.258 
The Minnesota approach is identical to the lower court’s 
analysis in Borough of Harvey Cedars.  Both approaches limit the 
consideration of benefits unless the property owner is the sole benefi-
ciary.  Minnesota still adheres to the partial takings analysis that was 
criticized by the New Jersey State Supreme Court. 
IX. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF EXCLUDING BENEFITS FOR 
COMPENSATION 
A. The Windfall Threat 
The New York approach, which excludes all benefits to the 
remaining land, fails to reflect the true loss for partial takings along 
the coast.  This approach disregards the policy purposes behind beach 
replenishment programs.  The importance of rebuilding the shore for 
coastal communities has been emphasized in the wake of Hurricane 
Sandy.259  These programs are not an inconvenience for coastal resi-
dents—they are a necessity.  By excluding all benefits conferred up-
on the remaining land, there is great potential for windfall judgments 
for property owners.260  In many cases, if government agencies did 
not undertake dune replenishment, private homeowners would be left 
funding such efforts themselves.  Aside from providing much needed 
protection, significant maintenance and sustainability costs for 
 
255 Id. at 537-38 (describing trial court decision where the jury was told that if it believed 
the frontal access was in fact a special benefit it may be deducted, but it was up to the jury 
members to make that finding). 
256 State by Lord, 116 N.W.2d at 538. 
257 State by Mattson v. Colon, 194 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Minn. 1972). 
258 Id. at 580. 
259 Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013, supra note 45. 
260 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 541. 
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coastal owners have been reduced as well. 
In Chiesa, Judge Jasen dissented, explaining the threat of 
windfall judgments in favor of individual property owners if calcula-
ble benefits were not offset.261  This windfall threat was also a driving 
factor in the Borough of Harvey Cedars decision.262  Judge Jasen 
supported the Bauman approach because otherwise property owners 
receive two forms of compensation: the benefit of the project and a 
greater damage award because those benefits did not lower the pay-
ment for condemned land.263  This point cannot be more telling when 
beach replenishment disputes arise.  There seems to be no sound rea-
soning in the New York approach to overlook the fair market value 
when it is ascertainable at the time of the taking. 
Likewise, the Minnesota approach, similar to New York’s, 
has the potential for windfall judgments for property owners.  Be-
cause special benefits must be distinct to the property owner, it is ex-
tremely likely that benefits produced by beach replenishment pro-
grams would be considered general.  Thus, like New York, the 
protection provided by replenished dunes would be entirely excluded 
from consideration.  Once again, this result is inequitable and over-
compensates property owners. 
Jurisdictions that disregard the benefits of protective public 
work projects allow coastal residents to enjoy protection from near 
certain loss for free.  Shoreline property owners would need to fund 
similar beach nourishment projects themselves, absent the impressive 
responses by federal, state and local governments.  Instead, tax gen-
erated revenue, which comes directly out of the public’s pocket, pro-
vides funding for the projects that directly benefit front row coastal 
owners.264  With long-term plans of government-funded replenish-
ment, coastal owners’ remaining property continues to receive these 
benefits free of charge into the indefinite future. 
 
261 Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 334 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
262 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 541. 
263 Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 333 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
264 See About the Agency, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about-agency (last visited May 2, 
2014) (reviewing the history of FEMA dating back to 1979, when President Carter signed an 
executive order creating the agency, which then became a federal administrative body fund-
ed by tax revenue). 
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B. The Confusion of the General versus Specific 
Distinction 
The distinction of benefits based upon uniqueness to the indi-
vidual property owners is not useful in cases involving beach replen-
ishment programs.  In Borough of Harvey Cedars, the lower court 
struggled when applying the original state approach which was simi-
lar to the New York and Minnesota view.265  The case became fo-
cused solely on whether the dune wall was a benefit to the Karans’ 
property in a unique manner or in a way that was mutually enjoyed 
by the entire community.266  In fact, the dune wall provided both a 
general and special benefit as defined by the New Jersey common 
law.267  Thus, the common law distinction was arbitrary in this cir-
cumstance. 
This dispute is a clear indication of the inefficiencies of the 
New York and Minnesota approach.  The very nature of the claim 
concerned an arbitrary distinction that resulted in significantly differ-
ent outcomes.268  Coastal protection projects undertaken by govern-
ment agencies serve a multitude of purposes.269  Distinguishing the 
difference between these purposes is not only difficult, but it is also 
irrelevant for determining the value of loss to the individual owner.270 
Statistically, coastal properties have a much greater chance 
and degree of destruction or loss in the event of a natural disaster or 
periodic erosion.271  Although these projects are designed with the in-
tention of providing broad protections for entire coastal communities, 
ultimately beachfront properties are directly benefited because of the 
 
265 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526. 
266 Id. at 526. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 533. 
269 See N.J. Beach Replenishment Programs Underway in Monmouth Towns, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 3, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.nj.com/monmouth/index.ssf/2014/01/nj_beach_ 
replenishment_work_to_start_in_monmouth_towns.html (discussing the benefits of beach 
replenishment providing protection against erosion, tidal surge, periodic flooding, and struc-
tural damage). 
270 See Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 539 (explaining that the distinction is “dif-
ficult even for trained legal minds.”). 
271 Jeff Waters, RMS: Insight and Observations of a Superstorm, PROPERTY CASUALTY 
360 (Oct. 30, 2013), http://m.propertycasualty360.com/2013/10/30/rms-insight-and-
observations-of-a-superstorm (explaining the repercussions of Hurricanes Katrina, Ike and 
Sandy on coastal insurance and property law and the heightened risks following these major 
natural disasters). 
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heightened risk of loss associated with living directly on the shore.272  
As the lower court decision in Borough of Harvey Cedars demon-
strated, maintaining the common law distinction between general and 
special benefits seriously complicates the process of compensating 
property owners and leads to an undesirable legal conflict.273  Instead, 
calculable and ascertainable benefits should be accounted for because 
this is a logical approach that is quantifiable and easier to apply. 
C. Justifications for Excluding Benefits Fail to 
Materialize Along the Coast 
Although the ultimate justifications for prohibiting the con-
sideration of benefits for the remaining land have merit, they are not 
applicable in a coastal context.  The concerns raised in Chiesa, re-
garding the possible discontinuation of the benefits derived from 
government projects, are not relevant in the coastal situations dis-
cussed in this Comment.  Each of the beach re-nourishment projects 
presented, ranging from Florida to New Jersey, stipulated for a pro-
longed management of the condemned property.  The projects were 
implemented with a long-term plan for continued assessment and re-
plenishment that would allow for a sustainable shoreline.  Because 
these projects are constantly ongoing as the coastline changes, there 
is no need to be concerned with whether the project will continually 
provide the benefits being used to reduce compensation. 
Moreover, the policy concerns behind approaches that ex-
clude benefits shared by adjacent properties are not relevant in a 
coastal setting.  The Supreme Court of Minnesota explained it is not 
fair that partially condemned property owners suffer a loss and a ben-
efit from public projects, but adjacent properties enjoy the same ben-
efit without losing a portion of their land.274  However, as explained 
by the Borough’s expert in Borough of Harvey Cedars, the threat of 
loss is remarkably heightened for property located immediately on 
the shore compared to property located two and three rows inland.275  
Despite the shared benefits of these projects, the tangible benefits for 
 
272 See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 529 (citing the Borough’s expert re-
port showing that the coastal property owners only had “a 27% chance of” avoiding any loss 
over a fifty year period). 
273 Id. 
274 State by Mattson, 194 N.W.2d at 579. 
275 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 529. 
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first row homeowners are significantly greater and directly enhance 
shoreline properties’ sustainability. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The fair market value approach set forth in Borough of Har-
vey Cedars establishes the most effective method of valuing partially 
taken property along the coast.276  As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held, “just compensation should be based on non-conjectural and 
quantifiable benefits, benefits that are capable of reasonable calcula-
tion at the time of the taking.”277  Computing compensation without 
accounting for these benefits awards coastal property owners windfall 
judgments “at the public’s expense” that are “above the fair market 
value.”278 
When the remaining property is safer and more secure, paying 
exorbitant amounts in return for inconvenient beach access or the loss 
of an ocean view does not reflect the value of the land before and af-
ter the taking.  As the court in Borough of Harvey Cedars explained, 
potential buyers will certainly value the view of the ocean, however 
“a rational purchaser would place a value on a protective barrier that 
shielded his property from partial or total destruction.”279  Simply put, 
compensation should be reflected as the “quantifiable decrease in the 
value of [the] property—loss of view— . . . set off by any quantifia-
ble increase in its value—storm-protection benefits.”280 
The ultimate price of protection can only be represented by 
considering all effects of dune re-nourishment programs for coastal 
properties.  Beach replenishment projects directly benefit shoreline 
property owners more extensively than adjacent inland property.  
This tangible property interest cannot be ignored when computing 
just compensation for partially taken shorefront land. 
 
 
276 Id. at 543. 
277 Id. at 540. 
278 Id. at 542, 543. 
279 Id. at 541. 
280 Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 544. 
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